Easy to Start, Impossible to Finish III

April 1st, 2014

Ten major transportation and energy capital projects planned by the State of Alaska could cost up to $17.7 billion and would nearly quadruple Alaska’s debt service, says a new report by engineer and transportation expert Lois Epstein.

“State leaders need to decide if it makes fiscal sense to proceed with all of these expensive projects, especially given their limited returns on investment,” said Epstein, who is arctic program director for The Wilderness Society and previously directed the Alaska Transportation Priorities Project, a non-profit transportation watchdog organization.

The 10 projects and their costs are shown in the chart below, and on the second page of Epstein’s report, which is available here.

“The state has in hand only eight percent of the money it needs to build these 10 projects,” Epstein said. “With oil revenue in decline in the near-term after passage of SB 21, a law cutting taxes on oil production, we need leadership in Juneau to serve as a check on the governor and to prevent unwarranted projects from becoming burdens to the state for decades to come. Legislators should fund ‘needs’ like education and repairing crumbling infrastructure before funding ‘wants,’” she added.

Recommendations in the report include:
1) Pursuing only major road/bridge projects that address key transportation needs, e.g., increasing safety, reducing congestion, fixing deteriorating infrastructure, and addressing air quality problems.
2) Not starting projects that do not have the financial resources to be finished.
3) Not letting project momentum obscure the need to re-evaluate projects when adverse facts become available.

Table 1: Money available to construct major, proposed transportation and energy infrastructure projects vs. project costs

Easy to Start Impossible to Finish chart

The 5 Unanswered Questions of New KABATA BILL, HB 23

March 24th, 2014

After two days of testimony last week from only those state officials who support the Knik Arm Bridge, the Senate Finance Committee will resume deliberations this week on a new one page financing plan. Click here to view the plan. KABATA’s new estimated cost for Phase I of the Bridge is now at $894 million.

The new bill CSHB 23, authorizes $300 M in state bonds for the Bridge, counts on a $341 M low cost fed TIFIA loan that KABATA has been turned down for six times as well as $226 million in new federal funds above currently anticipated future federal transportation funds.

The Senate Finance Committee’s two rural Democrats that caucus with the majority, Senator Donny Olson (D-Golovin) and Senator Lyman Hoffman(D-Bethel) expressed great skepticism about the new plan. Senator Olson labeled it “a white elephant in the offing.”

But, the remaining Senate Finance Committee members, Chairman Kevin Myer(R-Anch), Co-Chairman Pete Kelly (R-Fairbanks), Anna Fairclough (R-Eagle River), Click Bishop (R-Fairbanks), and Mike Dunleavy (R-Wasilla) seemed broadly supportive of the new measure because it throws out the whole Public Private Partnership (P3) structure and instead has the state finance the bridge directly at a lower interest cost. (However, the extra cost of presumably state employees as toll collectors and the state contracting for O&M will lower those savings since the P3 structure had the contractor operate and maintain the bridge.)

For press accounts of the committee’s deliberations see Lisa Demer’s two articles in the Anchorage Daily News: New Funding Plan for the Knik Arm Bridge and Legislators Hear New Knik Bridge Financing Plan. Also see Pat Forgey’s article in the Alaska Dispatch, Legislature Considers Restructured Knik Arm Bridge Plan, Minus ‘the Middleman’.

Five Unanswered Questions

The Finance Committee listened closely to Municipal Bond Bank director Deven Mitchell as he estimated the state’s maximum liability for the project to be $450 million for the $251 million state revenue bond issue and $200 million of interest payments. Mitchell is well respected and considered a credible defender of the state’s AAA credit rating.

When the Senate Finance Committee resumes hearings on the bill, critics are expected to focus on five unanswered questions that may affect the Committee’s faith in that $450 million maximum cost estimate:

  1. Does section 37.15.255 (g) of CS HB 23 threaten the state’s credit rating?
    This section of the proposed bill states that the Commissioner of Revenue (currently a KABATA Board member) will annually estimate the amount of money necessary to replenish the bond reserve fund to meet debt obligations. Then the legislature “may” appropriate the necessary funds. The section also states that “nothing in this section creates a debt or liability of the state.”

    However, the language of this section is considered by bond attorneys to be standard “moral obligation” language that commits the state. If, because of insufficient toll revenue, the legislature refused to appropriate the necessary funds for the federal TIFIA loan payments, the first ever default by a state agency would result and the state’s credit rating could then fall below investment grade.

    As described by Deven Mitchell, any toll revenue would be allocated in the following order: (1) Operations and Maintenance of the bridge (2) Pay off the hoped for $341 million federal TIFIA loan (3) Pay off the up to $300 million state revenue bond.

    The state’s moral obligation has never been tested. In the past, if AIDEA or AHFC projects failed, those state agencies had sufficient profits and reserves to make the payments on agency paper.

    KABATA is a one project state agency and “if” (more likely “when” project critics say) the toll revenues are insufficient to pay off the federal loan, then the legislature would have the tough choice of either reneging on an agency obligation or coming with whatever amount is requested by the administration for the bond reserve fund. If the state reneges, the state’s credit rating would be lowered which would raise the cost of financing for the remainder of the state and local units of government.

    The standard term sheet for federal TIFIA loans requires an investment grade rating from at least two national rating firms for any funded project. How can this project earn an investment grade without directly pledging the state’s credit?

    The predictable dynamics of Section g of CS HB 23 threatens the state’s credit rating and puts in place an unlimited obligation for the legislature to perpetually replenish the bond reserve fund.

  2. Where are the New Numbers KABATA promised?
    The LB&A audit released in April, 2013 found that KABATA’s financial plan was based on traffic and toll numbers that were “undocumented” and “unreasonably optimistic.” KABATA responded by promising to redo the socio-economic projections. The new projections were to be complete by September 30, 2013. (Click here for additional reading.)

    KABATA used transportation dollars to buy statewide media promising a “fresh start” for the project and promising that the new data that would be “peer reviewed.” The KABATA Executive Director on August 27, 2013 also signed an agreement with the Anchorage Metropolitan Area Transportation Solutions (AMATS, the state/Muni Anchorage regional planning organization ) agency to share projected population, household, and job forecasts and coordinate this demographic data to aid regional planning.

    To date, no new population and employment forecasts, nor the Toll and Revenue forecasts based on that population and employment data have been released to AMATS, the legislature, or the public. After the skeptical LB&A audit, will the Senate Finance Committee approve a project guarantee and $300 M revenue bond authorization without seeing the promised new demographic and financial information?

    By approving CS HB 23 the legislature would in effect warrant the accuracy of the KABATA’s current traffic and toll revenue forecast which the legislature’s LB&A Committee has severely criticized.

  3. Will 36,000 vehicles a day cross the Bridge in 2035 or just 9,400?
    A $250,000 a day/$90 million a year difference in toll revenue.

    KABATA has not completed the Toll and Revenue forecasts they promised. However, last year the consulting firm HDR as part of the Wasilla bypass project for the Mat Su Borough and the state DOT&PF, updated Mat-Su population and employment numbers and projected 2035 traffic on Mat-Su roads using data from the 2010 Census. A Public Records Act request to the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities uncovered HDR’s estimate of 9,400 vehicles a day crossing the Bridge in 2035; KABATA’s last prediction for 2035 was 36,000 vehicles a day. The Highway to Highway project in 2009 projected half that or 17,700 trips. Click here to view the HDR distribution map of the 9,400 daily trips.

    HDR also projected there would be only 1249 jobs at Point MacKenzie in 2035, the northern terminus of the proposed bridge. KABATA’s last estimate for Point MacKenzie jobs was 10,455 or more than 8 times as many. That high number drove a extremely high toll revenue estimates that would be used pay off the bonds. Based on KABATA’s estimate of a one way $7.80 car toll and a $28 truck toll in 2035, the 26,600 difference in vehicle trips (36,000-9400) amounts to a difference of over $250,000 a day or $90 million a year in 2035.

    At the March 13, 2014 AMATS Technical Advisory Committee meeting Jamie Kenworthy distributed maps comparing KABATA, AMATS and HDR Numbers showing the large difference between population and employment numbers from the 2011 AMATS and 2013 HDR reports on the one hand and KABATA’s much higher numbers generated in 2011. A representative of the state Department of Transportation found the HDR-KABATA comparison misleading since the HDR numbers were just done for the Wasilla bypass and are not a regional forecast.

    However, Kenworthy believes the forecast is the best bridge forecast yet since HDR’s was the only traffic projection to use 2010 Census numbers and recent Alaska Department of Labor data to update neighborhood population and job data and then correlate the new data with existing traffic counts before making the updated traffic projections.

    The new HDR forecast is awkward for the state both because of the large difference in numbers between the new lower HDR numbers and the old higher KABATA numbers and because HDR is also a current KABATA contractor.

    In considering the reliance on toll revenue to repay the proposed KABATA bonds, will anyone in the legislature notice the large discrepancy of traffic numbers?

  4. Will the Bridge Cost $894 million, $1.6 Billion or More?
    The new 1 page public finance plan handed out to the Senate Finance Committee estimates the cost of a 2 lane Bridge and 2 lane northern approach roads at $894 million.

    The last Bridge cost number from KABATA was $1.6 Billion for a 4 lane Bridge. KABATA needed to show the higher $1.6 billion number in their December, 2012 submission to the LB&A audit since the KABATA plan showed the revenue from 4 full lanes of traffic in their financial plan.

    KABATA had earlier shown a $400-500 million additional cost for Phase II which includes a 4 lane Bridge and approach roads.

    The new finance plan for the Department of Revenue from consultant 1st Southwest counted on only 3/4 of the revenue projected from KABATA’s traffic and toll consultant CDM Smith. But those plans still only showed the cost of a 2 lane Bridge and the revenue from up to 40,000 vehicles a day. However, 20,000 to 22,000 vehicles a day are considered the maximum capacity on a 2 lane restricted highway.

    The Department of Revenue refused a January, 2014 request for 1st Southwest to release to the department and the public the backup spreadsheet behind the $50,000 4 page report that identified the new public finance option. The one page funding sheet handed out to members of the Senate Finance Committee had no backup spreadsheet showing the amount and timing of toll revenue and bond payments so the Committee had no feasible way to determine if the numbers add up.

    Will any legislators note that the new plan probably continues to rely on 4 lanes of tolled traffic crossing a 2 lane Bridge and then request a backup spreadsheet showing the timing of toll revenue and state bond and federal TIFIA repayments?

  5. What are the legislators’ real priorities?
    With an up to $2 Billion shortfall in revenue next year and a proposed equity stake in the proposed gas line, the end of session will reveal the state’s true priorities.

    While there are no recently released polls on the Bridge, a January, 2014 survey of Anchorage business leaders done by the McDowell Group for the Anchorage Economic Development Corporation put the Knik Arm Bridge near the bottom of the list of important projects. Ahead of the Bridge was the state budget, Cook Inlet resource development, the gasline, neighborhood safety, affordable housing, workforce training, Port expansion, Pebble Mine, and the Susitna-Watana Dam.

    It is clear that the state cannot finance all the major projects under consideration. A new report totaled the costs of the Knik Bridge, the Juneau Road, the road to Tanana, the road to Ambler mining district, and the Susitna-Watana Dam and concluded that the state has in hand only about 8% of expected funds to build all projects. If all projects were approved the state’s debt service would quadruple.

    It is also not clear if the House and Senate priorities will differ and whether those differences will be resolved prior to the session’s scheduled April 20 adjournment.

    The media has yet to notice a key difference between the KABATA bill which passed the House last April and the substitute for that bill heard in Senate Finance last week. After the audit the House Republican leadership had such little faith in KABATA leadership that the HB 23 they passed took the project from KABATA and move the project to AHFC where then AHFC Executive Director Dan Fauske pledged to redo the numbers on his own schedule.

    The Senate Finance substitute bill prohibits termination of KABATA and would keep KABATA in charge of the project until all project bonds had been paid off which presumably would be 25-30 years at a minimum even if the state and not toll revenue were used to make the payments.

    Will KABATA remain in charge of the project and where will the Bridge fit in overall legislative priorities?

Note: The link for all documents related to HB23 are found on the Legislature’s “Bill Action Status Inquiry System”, or BASIS at this link: http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&bill=HB23

Confusion: Session Opens with New KABATA Management, 2 Different Finance Plans and Missing Data

January 31st, 2014

In the last two months KABATA Executive Director Andrew Niemiec has resigned, two competing financial plans are now in play, and none of the KABATA promised backup from their “new” socio-economic data has yet been made public.

New Plan

Last month Revenue Commissioner, KABATA Board member, (and former First Southwest Senior Vice President) Angela Rodell released a new finance plan from consultant First Southwest Company (FSC) that showed a lower project cost than the public-private partnership plan (P3) that KABATA has pushed for over seven years. Click here for Lisa Demer’s Anchorage Daily News article which discusses the FSC plan.

Consultant First Southwest contrasted KABATA’s plan for a P3 project that had a maximum state payment of $3.2 Billion project being paid off in 35 years, with a direct state bonded project with a $689 million maximum state payment and no private partner, being paid off in 18 years. The First Southwest plan, click here, has the state appropriating $300 million up front. That amount is not included in the current list of state Department of Transportation projects. Instead, First Southwest calls for the $300 million to be diverted to the bridge from other state transportation projects.

Both the KABATA P3 plan and the FSC plan count on about $300 million in a low interest federal TIFIA loan that KABATA has now been turned down for 5 times. Furthermore, the First Southwest plan envisages that a TIFIA loan would be backed only by expected toll revenues. No recent federal awards have been made without a public or private backing for the TIFIA loan.

First Southwest was paid approximately $50,000 to produce the four page plan which included no spreadsheet or backup analysis to show the timing of toll revenue, debt payments, and obligations. For a critique of the First Southwest Plan by financial analyst Jamie Kenworthy sent to Commissioner Rodell on January 7, 2014, click here. The Department has yet to reply to that analysis, nor have they yet indicated whether any backup financial spreadsheets were provided to the Department or whether they consider the $50,000 contract now complete.

Governor vs Legislative Project Proponents?

Governor Parnell and the leading legislative proponents of the project may have different views of which plan should be pushed forward. In an Anchorage News interview, click here, the Governor indicated he preferred state bonding to the P3 structure since it would be lower cost and the P3 market had changed. Because Alaska has AAA credit, the state can borrow at lower cost than the Bridge contractor, and the First Southwest plan has the state putting $300 million in an up front “down payment”, the Governor is probably correct that the First Southwest Plan lowers the project’s cost. However, because the state now instead of the private contractor will be responsible for toll collections and maintenance, operating costs will be higher and those extra costs were not mentioned in the First Southwest plan.

However, the claim from the Governor and bridge proponents that “the market has changed” is curious reasoning to apply to the Alaskan project. Based on past bills submitted by KABATA, no contractor has ever been willing to take the risk of financing the project without a state guarantee to make up for expected toll shortfalls. With the recent bankruptcies of national P3 projects due to unexpected toll shortfalls, the market has in effect now come to the position Alaskan contractors and KABATA have held all along – state guarantees are required. Click here for an Alaska Dispatch article for additional detail.

Chief legislative bridge proponents, Mat Su legislators Senate President Charlie Huggins and House Finance Member Mark Neuman, according to the Alaska Dispatch article, still favor the P3 approach and seek to keep KABATA in charge of the project. However, the House-passed bill from last session moved the project to the Alaska Housing Finance Authority. No word has yet come from the legislature on whether or not new bills will need to be filed to accommodate the new public finance plan.

The debate over the two finance plans has made clearer that a dollar spent on the bridge is not available for other transportation projects. With a predicted dramatic drop in state revenues, it is not clear if a majority of both houses has the will to finance such a big ticket item in an election year.

Amidst confusion over bridge plans and oversight, 4 key questions will hopefully be answered before the legislature votes on whether to move the Knik Arm Bridge forward:

4 Key Questions

1. Where’s the new Finance Plan?

KABATA bought statewide media last year to publicize getting new “independent” socio-economic data after the Legislative, Budget and Audit Committee (LB&A) criticized the undocumented and optimistic old data behind KABATA’s “unreasonably optimistic” traffic and toll projections.

The new contractors, Cardno and Agnew:Beck were scheduled to finish producing new population and employment data by December 1, 2013. Then CDM Smith — the holdover traffic and revenue consultant heavily criticized in the audit — would then massage that socio-economic data to produce a new toll revenue forecast, and Citigroup – another holdover consultant – is then expected to release a new finance plan for the project.

Will the Senate or its committees hold hearings and vote on a KABATA bill without seeing a new finance plan based on the new data?

2. How different will the AMATS and KABATA numbers be?

Future population and jobs predictions are closely related to traffic and toll projections. The higher those projected traffic and toll numbers, the lower the Bridge can be projected to cost the state.

Last month, state demographer Eddie Hunsinger estimated that the Mat-Su Borough has grown an average of 2.35% a year since the April, 2010 Census. Click here to view the figures. At that rate, the Mat-Su will have 155,000 people by 2035.

KABATA originally projected 250,000 people for Mat Su in 2035. Then KABATA lowered the number to 200,000 after Anchorage Metropolitan Area Transportation Solutions (AMATS, the local transportation planning organization) questioned the projection of 250,000. (The state and ISER’s Scott Goldsmith, two years ago, separately estimated about 170,000 people in Mat Su in 2035.)

In December’s announcement of a new proposed town site near the bridge, Mat Su officials were apparently trying to show a potential scenario with high population density to justify optimistic bridge traffic projections. According to an Anchorage Daily News article (click here) questions on how the sewer and water infrastructure for the denser development would be paid for were ducked by local officials.

KABATA and the Muni of Anchorage now have a signed agreement to share socio-economic data. Because AMATS receives federal transportation planning funds, the bridge must have consistent cost and socio-economic data to fit with the 2035 AMATS adopted transportation plan. For the last 4 months KABATA has declined to brief AMATS on its data and plans. But KABATA acting Executive Director Judy Dougherty is scheduled to brief AMATS on February 13, 2014.

Will the new KABATA numbers be consistent with AMATS numbers and risk showing too little toll revenue to justify the state’s cost estimate? Or will KABATA again have higher population, job, and toll numbers and be inconsistent with the Anchorage-adopted transportation plan?

3. Why does the state plan from First Southwest show the revenue from 4 full lanes of traffic crossing a 2 Lane Bridge?

The First Southwest plan shows a $706 million cost for a 2 lane Bridge. But the plan is also based on 20 years of CDM Smith’s 2011 revenue projections which shows 36,000 trips a day when the maximum a restricted 2 lane highway can handle is 20,000 trips a day. (The Glenn Highway today carries about 30,000 trips a day between Mat-Su and Anchorage.) In December 2012 when KABATA had to give the LB&A auditor a finance plan, it showed a four lane bridge and approach roads with a total project cost of $1.6 Billion, not $706 million.

Will there be one media article or legislator to raise the issue that the new state plan STILL relies on the cost of 2 lane bridge with the revenue from traffic that can only fit on 4 full lanes?

4.What is the fate of KABATA’s remaining funds?

To date, KABATA has spent about $80 million with about $35 million of federal match remaining. The Governor’s FY2015 budget request for $55 million for KABATA included those federal funds. In a session likely to be dominated by talk of austerity and cutbacks, if at some point legislators decide they do not wish to provide the state guarantee required under either bridge plan, the leftover $35 million could be put in play. Those formerly earmarked federal funds are now state funds and can be spent on any eligible transportation project.

Former Government Hill Community Council President Bob French in his remarks to the Anchorage legislative caucus, highlighted both the project’s confused status and the choices ahead for the legislature, click here to read the remarks.

If the project does not receive the state guarantee to move forward, is this the year when the KABATA funds are reallocated to projects which can be built to meet existing transportation demands?

Or is it more likely that KABATA will continue to exist for a few more years spending the last of the earmarked funds on salaries, consultants, and PR?

Bob French 1/17 Letter to State Legislators

January 30th, 2014

Bob French attended the Anchorage Caucus Public Hearing on January 11, 2014, and was asked by several law makers to follow up by outlining his criticism of the First Southwest plan for public financing of the Knik Arm Bridge that has been taken up by Gov. Parnell.
This was his e-mailed response:

———- Original message ———-

From: Bob French 

Date: Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 12:22 AM

Subject: Bob French’s Testimony on the Knik Arm Bridge from 1-11-14 Pre-Session Caucus

To: Sen.Kevin.Meyer, Sen.Anna.Fairclough, Sen.Johnny.Ellis, Sen.Bill.Wielechowski, Sen.Cathy.Giesse, Sen.Fred.Dyson, Sen.Hollis.French@akleg.gov, Sen.Lesil.McGuire,
Cc: Rep.Andy.Josephson, Rep.Bob.Lynn, Rep.Charisse.Millett, Rep.Chris.Tuck, Rep.Dan.Saddler, Rep.Gabrielle.LeDoux, Rep.Geran.Tarr, Representative.harriet.drummond, Rep.Lance.Pruitt, Rep.Les.Gara, Rep.Lindsey.Holmes, Rep.Lora.Reinbold, Rep.Max.Gruenberg, Rep.Mia.Costello, Rep.Mike.Hawker

Thanks for listening at the Pre-Session Caucus.  Please feel free to contact me or Jamie Kenworthy if you have any questions or comments.

With 3 different and conflicting “visions” for KABATA, currently before the legislature, one thing is evident, there will be new opportunities to determine the future of the Knik Arm Bridge, and if it moves forward, to shape the state’s liability for it’s financing.  Those visions are expressed by: HB 23 transferring the bridge to AHFC, but still a Public Private Partnership (P3); SB 13 being the original version for the P3; and the latest Public Financing version that is apparently supported by Gov. Parnell, based on a plan by First Southwest Corporation (FSC).  Since the FSC version is pretty new, here is some background.

FSC’s recommendations came from a $50,000 contract with the Department of Revenue.  In contrast to the dozens of pages of financial spreadsheets and hundreds of pages of backup information that KABATA has available, FSC’s November 11, 2013 report has only 4 pages. We used a PRA to request the backup spreadsheets, but were told that “No backup spreadsheets or financial analysis were provided to Revenue, just this summary.”.  A highlighted version of those 4 pages is attached, with many important comments and questions, but it is evident that a lot more detail would be needed to provide the Legislature with an actual financial plan, which will certainly be necessary for the TIFIA application.  So look for that info in the future.  

Some considerations:  
Traffic forecasts are still critical.  Imagine having as much traffic hitting the A-C Couplet Downtown as the Glenn Highway currently sees beneath the Eklutna overpass only 14 years after bridge opening.  That is the scale of the traffic predictions that FSC accepted for their study.

Obviously, impacts to Downtown will be substantial, and not mitigated by KABATA.  If that amount of traffic does not show up, then toll revenues are unlikely to be enough to pay back the bonding.

KABATA has spent a lot on what they are touting as an “independent review” being done by Cardno/Agnew:Beck that was supposed to have been completed this fall.  That “new” Socio-economic data will then be turned over to CDM Smith to produce a revised Traffic & Revenue forecast.  So, not only are the revenue forecasts that FSC used already out of date, the new forecast will still have been done by the same discredited firm that has a track record of having less than half of the forecasted revenues being achieved.  The same CDM Smith who provided the T&R forecasts for at least 4 toll projects “Outside” that have gone bankrupt, or required major refinancing.

Here is the testimony that I gave:

My name is Bob French and I am speaking for myself.  I have been concerned about the effects of the Knik Arm Bridge on state finances for many years. 
Governor Parnell has apparently decided that giving an additional $600 million of state guaranteed profits to the bridge builder was not a great idea.  Unfortunately the state financing plan proposed by the First Southwest Corporation, still has many of the same fatal flaws of KABATA’s P3 plan.
The 1st SW plan is still relying on toll revenues to pay for all operations and maintenance costs as well as paying back a $276 million dollar TIFIA loan. Unfortunately 1st SW just accepted CDM Smith’s toll revenue forecast that was described as “unreasonably optimistic” by the legislative audit.  KABATA’s forecasted toll revenues won’t happen if new growth in the Mat-Su Borough is based on individual well and septic systems, it can only happen with centralized water and sewer systems. 
Another major concern I have, is KABATA pulling a “bait and switch” on the Legislature.  That is, getting the Legislature to guarantee payments based on “potential” future sources of funding, and then needing to change to more expensive funding, with the resulting higher payments still being guaranteed by the state.  That is still the case with public financing of the bridge. 
What happens if the Legislature doesn’t shift $300 million dollars for existing planned transportation projects over to KABATA?  If the legislature can’t decide on those suddenly “un-necessary” projects, where is that $300 million coming from?
What happens if KABATA is turned down by the feds for a 6th time for the $276 Million dollar low-interest TIFIA loan?
Even if they get the TIFIA loan, CDM Smith has a track record of less than half of the toll revenues they predict, actually showing up.  What happens when tolls are not enough to pay back those loans? 
Most importantly, does the legislature have veto power, if either the construction or financing costs turn out to be much higher than what you are being told right now?  Can you stop the project before it bankrupts the state?
Many folks here today are asking for additional funding.  I’m asking you to disband and cut all funding to KABATA, and use the remaining $55 Million to fund needed transportation projects.

End Testimony….

Because of time constraints, I obviously couldn’t provide a long summary.  Click here for a more detailed critique from an e-mail from financial analyst Jamie Kenworthy to Commissioner Rodell from last week.

Below is the annotated FSC plan:

Annotated First Page of FSC plan

Annotated second page of FSC Plan

Annotated 3rd page of FSC report

Annotated 4th page of FSC plan

Jamie Kenworthy 1/7/14 Letter to Commissioner of Revenue Angela Rodell

January 30th, 2014

Jamie Kenworthy asked the Department of Revenue several questions and made several comments following the Mid December public release of the four page “Financing Plan for Knik Arm Bridge” that was created for the DOR through a contract with First Southwest Company.
As of the date of this posting, there has been no response to this e-mail from the Dept. of Revenue.

—– Original Message —–
From: “James Kenworthy”
To: angela.rodell, deven.mitchell
Sent: Tue, 07 Jan 2014 06:10:03 -0900
Subject: Comments on First Southwest Plan for Knik Arm Crossing Project

What follows is an analysis of the 11/11/13 First Southwest memo to you on the proposed public financing plan for the Knik Arm Crossing. In initial conversation with Lacy Wilcox of your department, it is not clear to me whether the 11/11/13 memorandum represents the final work product for the Department of Revenue on this $50 K contract to First Southwest or whether the issues identified below can still be addressed. 

The analysis below shows the 11/11/13 First Southwest Plan (FSC Plan) is flawed because of four factors:

  • The plan utilizes the same employment and population data which was identified as overly optimistic by the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee’s Audit.  CDM Smith’s documented national record is to overestimate traffic and toll revenue by 118%.
  • The plan’s entire financial foundation is predicated upon unrealistically high toll revenues to cover operational costs, bond servicing, and TIFIA loan repayments. 
  • The plan perpetuates the egregious error of including four lanes of toll revenue while accounting for the cost of only a two lane bridge. To correct that error, either $500 million for the additional two lanes needs to be added to the cost or toll revenue needs to be reduced by $674 million (45%) over twenty years.
  • It is not clear why First Southwest argues a major feature of the FSC Plan is lower interest rates than the Public Private Partnership (P3) structure if the FSC Plan also requires a $300 million down payment from the state or over 40% of the alleged project cost.

Because of these issues and because no spreadsheet or backup financial calculations that appear to be deliverables in the Department’s RFP were included in the 11/11/13 memorandum, I think it is hard if not impossible to determine what the cost of the project with the PSC Plan will be within any acceptable range.

The FSC Plan appears to have the following flawed assumptions or undocumented work:

2 Lanes of Cost, 4 Lanes of Revenue
The FSC Plan uses a $706 million cost for a 2 lane Bridge and 2 lane northern approach road.  But the August, 2011 CDM Smith revenue base forecast (p. 33) which FSC Plan uses, includes revenue from 4 full lanes of tolled traffic on the Bridge in the ninth year the Bridge opens. By bridge year 9 CDM Smith shows revenue from 21,100 vehicles a day which is over capacity on a restricted 2 lane highway; by year 20 CDM Smith shows revenue from 36,000 daily tips, 6000 more than Mat-Su-Anchorage trips at Eklutna Flats on the 4 lane Glenn Highway today.  How are 36,000 daily trips possible on a 2 lane Bridge?

Either at least $500 M needs to be added to cost to build a 4 lane Bridge (plus more for 4 lanes northern approach) or no revenue can be shown on a 2 lane Bridge over at most 20,000 trips a day.  If the $706 million 2 lane Bridge cost is used with a maximum 20,000 daily trips capped at year 8, that reduces toll revenue by $674 million or 45% over 20 years per CDM Smith numbers.  This basic 2 lane/4 lane problem is why KABATA in December, 2012 submitted a $1.6 billion bridge cost to be included in the LB&A audit.

CDM Smith Track Record: Projections 2x Reality
The FSC plan says even if toll revenue is 75% of CDM Smith’s projection, the bond cover ratio is a comfortable 1.6.  But CDM Smith, per the Transportation Research Board data, has a national track record of overestimating revenue by a 118% (see http://knikbridgefacts.org/kabata-traffic-consultant-has-average-118-overestimation-error-rate-for-us-projects/ ) or more than a factor of 2 for the first years tolled projects were open.  That 2 times overestimation is consistent with Smith’s estimate of 2035 daily Bridge traffic of 36,000 trips a day versus the Highway to Highway number from CH2MHill using ISER data of 17,700 trips a day.  So without fixing the 2 lane of cost-4 lanes of revenue problem, even a more realistic 50% factor on CDM Smith revenue estimate puts the minimum bond cover ratio at 1.07 or way below the investment grade ratio necessary to sell state or TIFIA bonds without a state guarantee. 

The 2 times overestimating rate is similar to CDM Smith recently providing the Oregon legislature with a traffic and revenue public projection twice what it had provided private investors, (see http://knikbridgefacts.org/was-kabata-traffic-and-toll-consultant-cdm-smith-keeping-2-sets-of-books-to-hoodwink-oregon-legislators/)

No $276 Million TIFIA Loan Without State Guarantee
The FSC Plan projects a $276 million low interest federal TIFIA loan based only on toll revenue. Can First Southwest identify one successful federal TIFIA award to a toll project in the last five years that was not backed by a public or private guarantee or both?  The Knik Arm Crossing project has now been rejected 5 times for a TIFIA loan; without a public guarantee to cover the toll shortfall the sixth TIFIA application will almost surely meet the same fate.

Why Wasn’t Information from the LB&A Audit and Latest Socio-Economic Data Used?
The LB&A audit had some concrete findings as to the overly optimistic population and employment projections that underlay the P3 financial projections.  (It should also be noted that the numbers for operations, maintenance, and toll collection which First Southwest relied on came from KABATA and Citi, not CDM Smith.) Without consulting the audit work of independent traffic consultant Timothy James, how is it possible for First Southwest to examine the “credit worthiness” and “underlying economics” of the project?

Since KABATA has contracted with Cardno and Agnew:Beck for new socio-economic data that was due 11/30/13, when First Southwest completes its final financing plan, would it not make sense that the new population and employment data be used by a truly independent firm to estimate toll revenue? 

What’s the Real Cost?
How will the different elements of the FSC Plan be sequenced?  Is the legislature to commit to a 20 year $262 million bond but if the TIFIA loan does not materialize then the state bond amount will be increased to about $540 million?  Without a detailed “amortization schedule” (deliverable #5 in the Department of Revenue RFP) and “detailed financial calculations” and bond cover ratios (deliverable # 3 in the RFP) it is hard to understand how the Plan adds up and predict what the final cost to the state will be.

Just listing the two plans of finance on p. 3 of First Southwest 11/11/13 memorandum does not appear to meet the evaluation of amortization schedules for the two scenarios promised in deliverable # 5 and # 6.  Since the state putting down $300 million up front significantly lowers interest costs in any scenario, at a minimum a net present value calculation on that down payment should be part of any fair evaluation of P3 vs state finance scenarios.  The wording of the RFP deliverables appears to require the contractor to show their financial work.

I hope the above issues can be addressed before a final report from First Southwest is accepted by the Department of Revenue.  Thank you for any consideration these comments receive.

Jamie Kenworthy

Was KABATA Traffic and Toll Consultant CDM Smith Keeping 2 Sets of Books to Hoodwink Oregon Legislators?

December 5th, 2013

A multi-year wrangle between Oregon and Washington over financing of a new I-5 Bridge has now put the spotlight on the activities of CDM Smith, traffic and toll consultant to both the I-5 Bridge project and the Knik Arm Bridge. Smith had estimated that 160,000 vehicles a day in 2016 would cross the I-5 Bridge between the two states. However, a recent public records request to Oregon state government unearthed an “investment grade” number also provided by CDM Smith showing the bridge in 2016 would carry only half that traffic projection or 78,400 vehicles a day. Click here and here for the Portland articles.

Accusing CDM Smith of “keeping two sets of books,” an Oregon Republican legislator expressed anger at Oregon’s Democratic Governor for not disclosing the more pessimistic toll revenue projection to the legislature on the $2.8 Billion project when more realistic lower numbers were to be provided to potential investors.

Both the separate ”x” and “2x” numbers and the role of public records act requests in the Oregon story are eerily similar to CDM Smith’s role in the Knik Arm Crossing project. Smith has projected 36,000 vehicles would cross the Knik Bridge in 2035 and that number is key to the project’s financial plan. Two public records act requests to the Alaska Department of Transportation finally unearthed a number half that or 17,700 trips a day that CH2M Hill estimated using UAA-ISER data when CH2MHill modeled the 2035 Bridge traffic for the now indefinitely delayed “Highway to Highway” project.

CDM Smith has sometimes produced “investment grade” projections of traffic and toll revenue that project operators then used to sell bonds for toll projects. However, with CDM Smith’s 118% national average overestimation rate of tolled project (see 3/9/12 post below) and an increasing number of P3 toll projects in bankruptcy with resulting lawsuits over responsibility for toll shortfalls (see below), “investment grade” traffic and toll revenue studies by the industry are increasingly rare.

The latest CDM Smith traffic and toll study done for the Knik Bridge has a disclaimer that represents the opposite of an “investment grade” study. The last page of CDM Smith’s 2011 report states, “The results contained in this report are not intended to be used to secure or obtain project financing and should be used for planning purposes only. The material should not be disclosed in any official statement, prospectus, private placement memorandum or other document used to facilitate, offer, buy, or sell securities.”

Unfortunately, the revenue numbers from that 2011 study were used by Citi in the financial plans provided to the Alaska legislature when the legislature debated bills to provide the project a state guarantee.

There are other similarities between the Knik Bridge and I-5 projects besides sharing the same controversial traffic and toll consultant. Since both projects are proposed Public Private Partnerships (P3s) projects, KABATA officials have traveled to the Vancouver, WA-Portland, OR area to review the I-5 project.

New National Trend: Shifting Risk to the Taxpayers

With eleven toll projects in various degrees of financial distress nationwide, copyrighted stories in the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg last week highlighted the recent trend of bondholders and construction firms to attempt to have states to guarantee the funds necessary to make up for “unforeseen” toll shortfalls. P3s have been promoted as a way for the private sector to take the risk of building infrastructure. However, many projects are now experiencing toll collections lower than projected. As a result, private project operators and bondholders now want the states to guarantee sufficient revenue to pay project costs. The bankruptcies and financial restructuring clearly demonstrate that while state guarantees are good for the bondholders, they’re not good deals for states.

The Wall Street Journal article focuses on the recent bankruptcy of American Roads LLC, a company set up by Australian bank holding company Macquarie Group to finance construction of five tolled bridge and road projects in Michigan, Alabama and Florida. Lower than projected toll revenues led to a failed debt restructuring plan, a lawsuit between Macquarie and the company insuring the financing, and a July 2013 Chapter 11 filing. A Macquarie US subsidiary is the co-leader of one of the three consortia preselected by KABATA to build the Knik Arm Crossing, see here.

The Bloomberg article (click here) details the trend to shift risk from the project operators to the taxpayers in ways that increase state costs. The managing director of a New York municipal bond research firm is quoted as saying, “You never see a consulting report be negative or else they won’t be able to sell the bonds.”

In a sense, KABATA has been ahead of the recent national trend. The private consortia competing to build the Knik Bridge have consistently refused to take the risk that tolls alone would be able to finance 35 years of payments. So all bills introduced in the legislature to promote the project have contained a de facto state guarantee for the contract with the bridge developer.

Two Forms for Alaska to hold the Downside Risk: P3 or Direct State Finance?

If the toll revenue forecasts for P3 projects are so unreliable that they now “require” a state guarantee for sufficient revenue to pay obligations, why shouldn’t the state just finance the project directly at lower cost?

That is the question financial firm First Southwest, (the former employer of newly promoted Department of Revenue Commissioner and KABATA Board Member Angela Rodell), is studying for the Department of Revenue. According to KABATA’s, the state could save approximately $600 million if Alaska financed the project directly at around 4%. That is because KABATA’s financial plans show the contractor receiving an estimated 12% annually to sell bonds based on a state contract whose payments would be guaranteed. As outlined above, the guarantee is built into the “KABATA” bills that have failed to pass the legislature the last four sessions.

While a significant cost savings, direct state financing would put KABATA’s billion-dollar plus project in heavy competition to get in the state capital budget.

The First Southwest report is due at the end of this month.

KABATA Backs off Efforts to Demolish Existing Businesses

KABATA has now acquired most of the Government Hill properties within the right of way needed to construct the Knik Arm Crossing although it has on hand only about 2% of the estimated costs of the project. Recent articles in the Anchorage Daily News (click here and here) have highlighted the fate of two Government Hill businesses, a Subway shop and Tesoro gas station that sit on land under long term lease from the Alaska Railroad that KABATA has sought. The Subway representative is quoted as saying that KABATA had no interest in leasing the business back but just wanted to demolish it. Perhaps in response to the front page publicity, at its November Board meeting the KABATA Board reiterated its efforts to acquire the land but passed a resolution so that, once acquired, KABATA would be willing to lease the land back to the two businesses so they could continue to operate until the land was needed for construction. This was not an option that KABATA has allowed in acquiring the Sourdough Hotel and three residential homes and small businesses. Contracts are now being prepared for those properties to be demolished this spring. For a copy of the KABATA press release click here.

Running in Place

November 4th, 2013

With less than 2% of the funds in hand to build the Knik Arm Bridge, the Knik Arm Bridge and Toll Authority (KABATA) has in the last few months plowed ahead acquiring property, hiring more consultants, and broadcasting statewide ads about a “fresh start” with “peer review” for the project.

However, KABATA’s new work protects its ability to do transportation planning separately from existing transportation planning agencies and ensures that the new data will not be reviewed by the Anchorage Metropolitan Transportation Solutions (AMATS) this year.

A November 3, 2013 front page Anchorage Daily News article quoted KABATA’s deputy executive director Judy Dougherty saying “the project is a go” though the legislature has yet to approve financing for the project.

So despite over a million spent in consulting work for the “new” socioeconomic population and employment data, it remains likely that when the legislature convenes again in January, 2014 legislators will again face non-reviewed data on the project’s financial feasibility.

Ready to Demolish Homes and Businesses?

Dueling Compass pieces in the Anchorage Daily News questioned and defended the prudence of KABATA acquiring property and announcing plans to demolish Government Hill acquired structures either this fall or next spring.

First, in this compass piece, new Government Hill Community Council President Stephanie Kesler asked how an agency that had spent $85 millio of its original $112 million federal earmark could be acquiring property when the legislature has repeatedly denied further state funding for the KABATA-estimated $1.6 billion needed to build the bridge. She accused KABATA of trying to create “an aura of inevitability” for a project that has “no realistic prospect” of being financed.

In reply, KABATA Executive Director Andrew Niemiec described the Bridge as “a State of Alaska project” that had to follow a “strict, formal process” to fairly compensate property owners. Perhaps ironically in a state whose officials often complain about federal overreach, Director Niemiec mentioned that the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA) had “selected” the Erickson Street route on Government Hill for the Anchorage approach. “Approved” may have been a more accurate description of FHWA’s role in the project than “selected,” since the route and project right of way funding were triggered by an August, 2011 State of Alaska funding request to FHWA.

KABATA now has 4 of the 10 Government Hill properties on the Anchorage side for the Phase I route. Remaining are buyout agreements with the Tesoro gas station, and the Subway sandwich shop, and negotiations with the Alaska Railroad for the land beneath the Tesoro gas station and Subway, and portions of Sunset and Harvard parks. In the November 3 Daily News article, Subway owner Steve Adams indicates he is willing to sell the land to KABATA if they will lease it back to him until needed. But Adams quotes the position of KABATA toward his business as “Nope, we want to tear it down.” Adams believes KABATA “has the cart before the horse.”

While KABATA’s push to acquire and demolish property appears to try to create some physical evidence on the ground showing the Bridge is inevitable, the Government Hill Tesoro and Subway have separate long term leases from another state agency, the Alaska Railroad.

Permit Status: Where’s the Governor?

Aside from two state agencies flashing separate green and yellow lights on acquiring project right of way, Governor Parnell gave a guarded response to a question on his commitment to the bridge at the Wasilla Chamber of Commerce last week. Governor Parnell said the necessary permits were “years away” and said the legislature needed to focus on projects that could be built immediately. See here for more details.

While the Bridge has received a Record of Decision on its Environmental Impact Statement, KABATA has been in discussion with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for a Biologic Opinion for the incidental taking of fish and beluga whales during construction and with the Army Corps of Engineers for a Section 404 permit. For two years, KABATA Board minutes disclose that those NMFS and Corps permits are likely to be soon issued. But to date, no NMFS or Corps 404 permits have been issued. Concerns from the Army Corps of Engineers and presumably NMFS were a key factor in KABATA’s to lengthening the planned bridge span by a 1000’ to 9200’ in 2011. The proposed Bridge is now longer than San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge.

It may be the Governor knows that to get its final permits from the Corps and NMFS that the bridge will have to be lengthened from 9200’ up to 14,400’ which would greatly increase the cost of the project. Or it may be that the governor has no information on where permitting stands but just did not want to take a stand on the costly project in an election year.

Stiffing AMATS and FHWA?

The “fresh start’ in KABATA’s statewide radio ads refer to the expected role of new consultants, Cardno and Agnew:Beck to revise socio-economic data to project new population, household, and employment data by neighborhood or traffic analysis zones (TAZ) out to 2055. That work was scheduled to be completed November 1st.

What KABATA has avoided mention of, is that when the new data is produced, it will then be turned over to KABATA’s same traffic and revenue consultant CDM Smith whose previous work was discredited by the 2013 Legislative and Budget Audit, to model the new traffic and revenue numbers which will result in revised toll revenue numbers. Those revised toll numbers will then be used by KABATA’s existing financial consultant CITI, to produce a revised financial plan.

In the last quarter (7/1/13-9/30/13), KABATA has spent $201,784 on work by those retained consultants, CDM Smith and Citi.

It is not yet clear if in effect, the new sausage ingredients of revised socio-economic data are to be fed into the same black box traffic model to produce essentially the same financial plan. All previous KABATA “pro forma” financial plans since 2009 have shown a federal TIFIA loan of $300-500 million and the revenue from about 36,000 vehicles a day crossing the Bridge around 2035 or twice the ISER-CH2MHill estimate. Both the federal loan and the higher amount of traffic are necessary in order to try to demonstrate that the project could eventually pay back a proposed state loan.

KABATA staff described the status of their TIFIA loan request to the KABATA Board last month as “valid but on hold.” However, because KABATA was not asked by TIFIA to advance its letter of interest to a full application, the $500 million loan request is dead for this year’s round of TIFIA funding. (Earlier, TIFIA had written to KABATA to say the most KABATA would ever qualify for is a third of the project cost or about $300 M pre-financing.)

This year’s Legislative Budget and Audit (LB&A) review of the project criticized the undocumented and overly optimistic data of the work of CDM Smith and Citi as well as the demographic data.

In May, 2013 financial analyst Jamie Kenworthy made a brief presentation to the AMATS Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) asking that by end of 2013, the TAC produce a TAZ map for 2035 Anchorage Transportation Plan that includes a tolled Knik Arm Crossing. The updated 2035 AMATS TAZ map could then be compared to the new 2035 TAZ data from the new KABATA consultants. This would allow the public and the legislature to come to their own conclusions regarding the reasonableness of the numbers behind KABATA’s expected new financial plan.

The TAC discussed making a TAZ map public by the end of the year, but took no action.

While KABATA describes the new socioeconomic consultants as coordinating with AMATS, Anchorage, and the Mat Su Borough, there is no requirement in the KABATA RFP for the product of that new work to be consistent with existing transportation plans. Nor is there any process yet identified to reconcile different KABATA traffic forecasts with the 2035 AMATS Anchorage Transportation Plan numbers. Nor is there a requirement that the cost of the KABATA Bridge to be included in the AMATS 2035 plan as requiring future transportation funding.

In recertifying AMATS in 2011 as the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the Anchorage area, the FHWA urged KABATA, AMATS and affected units of local government to work together to insure consistent population, traffic, and coordinated financial plan for both the Bridge project and all other Anchorage area transportation improvements.

The AMATS TAC has invited KABATA to present its plans to the October, November, and December TAC meetings as a step to the coordinated planning expected of a MPO that FHWA has pushed for. KABATA has refused the invitation to those last three TAC meetings of the year.

Evidently the “peer review” promised in the KABATA radio ads does not include include Anchorage’s traffic planning body, AMATS or indirectly the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as peers.

A New Spokesman Without a Project Cost Number

Last year before the 2013 legislative session, KABATA Chairman Michael Foster served as the public spokesman for the project by writing opinion pieces in the state’s papers and speaking to the Resource Development Council. KABATA’s 2012 Annual Report featured supportive quotes and pictures of Anchorage Mayor Dan Sullivan and Mat Su elected officials. But the glossy 14 page report omitted the names of KABATA Executive Director Andrew Niemiec and CFO Kevin Hemenway.

Perhaps in response to the rough treatment of Chairperson Foster by House leaders in their attempt to transfer the bridge project from KABATA to AHFC, the Anchorage Daily News Compass piece and Resource Development Council project update were undertaken by KABATA Executive Director Andrew Niemiec.

In neither the News column nor the RDC presentation — which included a slide “By the Numbers” — did Executive Director Niemiec provide KABATA’s latest cost estimate for the project.

In the November 3rd Daily News article, KABATA cited a $710-$750 million project cost. When reporter Lisa Demer cited the project cost as $1.6 Billion from KABATA’s last public finance plan of December, 2012, KABATA explained the roughly $900 million difference as financing costs and a proposed $150 million state loan. However, KABATA’s lower number of $710-750 million was for Phase 1 that included only 2 lanes on the Bridge. But since the Phase 1 low number also included the revenue from four full lanes of traffic from 2021 to 2051, KABATA had to include four lanes on the Bridge and approach roads in the December, 2012 estimate. This resulted in the project cost jumping $600 million from that one item alone.

Summary: Same Old, Same Old?

For the current fiscal year starting on 7/1/13, the Legislature provided a 27% increase to KABATA’s operating budget which has allowed the agency to increase its profile through paid statewide media and hire new consultants and rehire old consultants to redo the work criticized by the April, 2013 LB&A audit.

When the Legislature reconvenes in January, 2014, despite this higher level of expense and activity, the Bridge project is likely to be in a familiar place:

  1. A revised financial plan is likely to show again a $300-500 million federal TIFIA loan they have recently again been turned down again for now the sixth time.
  2. While there may be new socioeconomic data projections, that data will have modeled by the same traffic and revenue consultants with the likely expected result that the project will again show apparent financial feasibility.
  3. Unless KABATA changes course in terms of sharing data with AMATS and the public, there will be limited ability of knowledgeable non-KABATA experts or the public to critique the assumptions behind the revised KABATA financial plan.
  4. Without the permits that set the length and likely cost of the bridge and without having performed the additional drilling that KABATA geotech consultant Shannon and Wilson recommended in 2009 to establish the depth of the unstable Bootleggers Clay in Knik Arm, any KABATA cost estimate for the Bridge will need to be set in a wide range.

So when the legislature faces the annual KABATA request for a full state guarantee to make up the toll shortfall, legislators will again be asked to make more than a billion-dollar decision with non-reviewed information.

It will be as if the 2013 LB&A audit never happened.

In short, another $4-5 million in state transportation funds will have been expended in the last year but little will have changed about the prospects for the $1.6 billion plus project.

Golden Fleece Award to the Project that Epitomizes Planning Confusion: or The More Things Change, The More They Remain the Same

July 23rd, 2013

The Alaska Legislature’s April adjournment left KABATA without the state guarantee needed to move the project forward. As a result, in an attempt to appear responsive to legislator concerns, KABATA has launched a flurry of activities. However, the result will most likely be another numbers gridlock in the legislature.

New Consultants and New Planning Process: The Government Funded Train Wreck

Recent KABATA activities are listed below with italics highlighting the departures from standard practice that foreshadow next year’s expected legislative train wreck.

First, in response to the LB&A audit, KABATA announced that they would hire a new firm to review and revise the socioeconomic data of previous contractors that led to a traffic and revenue forecast that the LB&A audit characterized as undocumented and overly optimistic. On May 22, KABATA issued a press release asking for proposals for a mere 2 weeks later to produce new projections of populations, households, and jobs by traffic analysis zones (TAZ), or neighborhoods, for the 2015-2040 period as well as to revise the 2012 baseline data for Anchorage and Mat-Su. The RFP asked for baseline data due by 7/31/13 and a final report by 8/15/13; this requires significant data gathering and analysis to be performed relatively quickly. This rushed schedule is apparently necessary so new demographic information can be used to produce a new traffic and revenue forecast to replace the Wilbur Smith and Associates Toll forecast that was discredited by the legislative audit as undocumented and unreasonably optimistic.

Separate Planning Processes

AMATS, the State and Municipality of Anchorage joint planning committee is the federally designated Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the Anchorage area and as the MPO, it produced the traffic analysis zone (TAZ) data of people, households and jobs by neighborhood that underlies the adopted 2035 Metropolitan Transportation Plan.

Curiously, the KABATA RFP Statement of Services (see page 13) requires the contractor to consult with numerous organizations but not AMATS, the Municipality of Anchorage, or the Mat Su Borough. The RFP makes clear the KABATA product is to be an “independent” forecast and analysis from data used by Anchorage and the Mat-Su Borough. The practical effect of this RFP is to ensure that KABATA will continue to do separate planning based on what they expect to be higher growth numbers than are used as the basis for current South-central transportation plans. In effect KABATA will not need to coordinate or accept the population and job forecast of existing transportation plans or the role of AMATS as the MPO.

On May 9, 2013 Jamie Kenworthy briefed the Technical Advisory Committee of AMATS on lessons from the LB&A audit, the growth in the Bridge cost, and the need for KABATA to work with AMATS to produce transparent traffic analysis zone data on population, and household, and job numbers. Those analyses would have to be complete by the end of the year in order for the legislature to have a single set of demographic assumptions in front of them or, if KABATA’s assumptions differ, the reasons why the estimates differ. The AMATS committee briefly discussed the feasibility of updating their current TAZ data and releasing it to the public by the end of the year but no commitment was made.

During the discussion of the 2035 update to the Anchorage Transportation Plan in 2012, Municipality of Anchorage, consultant Jon Spring produced data and maps showing the KABATA’s and AMATS differing KNIK Goose Bay Road and Point MacKenzie population and job projections. But because Mr. Spring’s presentation was during a TAC work session, those materials were not made public and no mention of the discussion is available in AMATS minutes.

A third planning project is also underway with Tom Brigham of contractor HDR Inc. working with the Mat-Su Borough on early plans for a Wasilla bypass between the general areas of Glenn-Parks intersection and the Parks Highway-Big Lake turnoff. Before recommending a general route for the bypass, Brigham is updating land use changes based on the 2010 Census, revising the TAZ data for the Mat Su Borough, and using the traffic model AMATS used in preparing their 2035 Anchorage Plan to project future demand.

And what Bridge assumption is HDR using in assigning traffic flowing north-south through the Anchorage-Mat-Su area in planning a possible Wasilla bypass? Rather than model both a Bridge or no Bridge scenario or having to show a lower volume of Bridge traffic than predicted by KABATA numbers, Brigham is threading the needle by following the Bridge assumption in the Anchorage 2035 Plan. The adopted Anchorage Plan included the Bridge with the now discredited approximately 36,000 trips a day in 2035 that KABATA projects but only through the manipulation of modeling the Bridge as no toll facility to make the high number look more feasible.

Research shows that tolls reduce demand significantly and on average drivers will choose a 5-8 mile detour to avoid paying them. There are no current plans for a non-toll Bridge – the choice is toll Bridge or no Bridge — so plugging an impossible condition into the HDR traffic model could compromise the data used to plan the Wasilla bypass project.

Meet the New Consultant, Same as the Old Consultant?

On April, 23, 2013 KABATA Board Chairman Michael Foster told the KABATA Board that given the LB&A audit, KABATA was prepared to redo the demographic and traffic data to provide the legislature with accurate data. Foster contrasted the “micro approach” the LB&A traffic consultant took with the “macro approach” KABATA’s consultants chose. Interestingly, Chairman Foster appeared to have telegraphed KABATA’s intent to stick with the larger discredited growth model for the Mat-Su Borough by stating that Knik-Fairview will be the fourth largest city in the state.

KABATA Board members Transportation Commissioner Kemp and Revenue Commissioner Butcher were both present at the April Board meeting and they referenced discussions with the Governor’s office to second the Chairman’s indication that KABATA needed to provide accurate data to the legislature. Neither Commissioner indicated if they agreed or disagreed with the Chairman’s apparent conviction regarding a high growth scenario for the Mat-Su Borough.

On June 12, KABATA announced that Australian firm Cardno Inc. in association with Anchorage firm Agnew::Beck had won the up to $150,000 contract to provide new TAZ data with a final report (now due 9/30/13).

Funding Confusion in Transportation Planning?

KABATA has now spent over $75 million of the original approximate $114 million. While the original federal earmark is now state funds that can be spent on any eligible transportation project, the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA) has to approve the release of those funds for the new $150,000 consultant contract.

On June 25, 2013, former Government Hill Community Council President Bob French wrote FHWA, (click here for the letter) reminding them that in their 2011 recertification of AMATS as the Metropolitan Planning Organization, FHWA strongly suggested the KABATA project be integrated with Anchorage Transportation Plan, including a budget showing how Bridge and non-Bridge improvements were reasonably likely to be funded from expected revenue. French’s note asked how FHWA could have federal funds now underwrite KABATA’s separate planning function and demographic data without KABATA being required to coordinate with AMATS.
To date, FHWA has not responded to Bob French so it remains likely that federal funds will continue to underwrite three apparently uncoordinated planning functions that could well be based on three different sets of TAZ data on neighborhood population and job numbers: the new KABATA contract, the Wasilla bypass study, and the existing AMATS transportation plan based on TAZ data that may or may not be updated before the end of the year.

Without FHWA intervention on the new KABATA contract, a more proactive AMATS, or a new commitment of KABATA to coordinate with other agencies and units of government, it remains likely that the confusion of numbers on future regional population and job forecasts will again be dumped on the legislature when they reconvene in January, 2014.

Finally, the Department of Revenue announced on July 10, 2013 that they would reissue the RFP to assess the financial feasibility of the Knik Arm project. The last attempt by the Department of Revenue to award of the last contract to perform was canceled when it became clear that the work would not be performed before the end of the legislative session after the former firm of Deputy Treasurer and KABATA Board member Angela Rodell protested the award to another firm and the Department of Revenue referred the protest to the Department of Law. (See 4/26/13 Post below “Department of Revenue: The Conveniently Canceled Financial Review.”) Proposals are due 7/31/13 for the one year (with two one year extensions) less than $100 K project consultant to advise on financial terms for the project. The RFP notes that the State Senate is expected to act on SB 13 or CSHB 23 during the 2014 legislative session but “the final form of the bill(s) and which will pass is unknown at this time.”

Project Wins “Golden Fleece” Award

Citing “a decade of waste,” on June 26, 2013, Washington DC-based Taxpayers for Common Sense awarded the Knik Bridge project its non-coveted Golden Fleece Award, see here for the press release.

In reaction, KABATA said that “nearly all” of the claimed $715 Million cost for the Bridge would be paid for by Alaskans. Click here for reporting on KABATA’s response.

Taxpayers for Common Sense cited a $1.621 Billion, not $715 Million, as the cost of the Bridge, a number taken from KABATA’s latest December 2012 Financial Plan which was included in the April, 2013 LB&A audit, see p. 25 of the audit. (The Bridge priced tag jumped $500 Million when the cost of a four lane Bridge was included since all previous Phase 1 KABATA Financial Plans had included the revenue from 4 lanes but only the cost of building 2 lanes. Under this latest KABATA Plan, the estimated contractor payments over 35 years is $3.3 Billion, see p. 33 of the audit.)

The Anchorage and Juneau papers picked up the national AP announcement of the award. On that Sunday the Anchorage Daily News usually tongue in cheek Ear column mentioning the award was titled “We Win Again”.

Juneau Empire: Group sees Knik Arm project as example of waste

KTNA: Knik Arm Bridge Under Fire From Taxpayer Advocacy Group

Mat-Su Valley Frontiersman: D.C. group blasts KABATA as Geotech Work for Bridge Begins

Legislative Session Ends With KABATA Alive but Project Still Stalled

April 26th, 2013

Despite a flurry of activity at the end of session which at one point promised to pass a bill that would launch the project and at another point threatened the existence of KABATA, the legislature adjourned without passing any legislation on the project.

Opponents of the project could take heart that without passage of HB 23 with its implicit state guarantee of an unlimited amount to make up for the toll shortfall and without the $10 million the Governor requested in the capital budget, the project lacks financing and so cannot move forward with an RFP or win a needed federal loan. Bridge supporters can be grateful that KABATA has a 27% increase in its operating budget that will allow more PR and outreach to sell the project in the coming year.

What is clear is that a majority of the legislature, at least rhetorically, supports building the Knik Arm Bridge but that same majority, at least in the House, is opposed to the extra expense of a public-private partnership versus direct state bonding. There appears to be a majority of legislators leery of KABATA continuing to manage the project, at least partly as a result of what the audit committee called KABATA’s “unreasonably optimistic” toll forecast.

A review of the legislative action in both houses reveals interesting fractures within and between both political parties.

The House: Push for State Guarantee Hits Audit

The drama of trying to get HB 23 through the House before the Legislative, Budget and Audit Committee (LB&A) released the audit came to a head on April 6.

HB 23 had eked through House Finance on April 3 with Co-chair Rep Bill Stoltze (a co-sponsor of the KABATA Bill) gaveling down questions from his fellow Republicans and at one point calling a recess when it appeared there were not the votes to pass the bill. HB 23 survived the committee with Republicans Neuman, Stoltze, and Tammie Wilson voting pass and six representatives voting to amend, Democrats Kawasaki, Gara, and Edgmon and Republicans Munoz, Holmes, and Costello, and Republican Steve Thompson with no recommendation.

The Committee was uneasy with HB 23 establishing a process for KABATA annually to certify how much working capital, overhead, administrative costs, and contractor payments they needed because then the legislature would face a tough dilemma. Either rubber stamp that amount or not appropriate the funds and trigger a likely downgrade of the state’s credit rating. For a discussion of the moral obligation language in the bill, click here for attorney Susanne DiPietro’s testimony.

On April 5 the LB&A meeting on the audit was moved from 9 AM to 5:30 PM while the House was scheduled to take up the bill at second reading at 11 am, both on Saturday April 6th. However, HB 23 was not taken up for a floor vote that morning, and the Rules Committee chaired by Craig Johnson (R-Anc) re-scheduled the bill on the House calendar for final vote on April 8.

The release of the audit that evening and the ensuing media coverage apparently moved enough votes, so rather than the House passing the bill as expected on April 8, the Republicans went into a 5 PM caucus that day and emerged to take the highly unusual step to send the bill back to the Rules Committee. There the Committee rewrote a longer bill by Representative Mia Costello (R-Anc) now called Amendment 1 to CS HB23 (Fin) v.0. The new bill moved the project from KABATA to Alaska Housing Finance Authority (AHFC) while in effect demoting the current KABATA Board to an advisory Board to AHFC for one year before going out of business. For Costello interview, click here.

Over the next two days the House Rules Committee took the unusual step of holding a limited hearing with only KABATA and AHFC testifying about the practical effects of the revised bill. While HB sponsor Mark Neuman (R-Big Lake) and KABATA Chair Michael Foster pleaded with the Committee not to approve CSHB 23 to gradually abolish KABATA, it was clear that the Republican leadership now backed Rep. Costello’s revised bill.

Testimony by AHFC Executive Director Dan Fauske indicated he would accept the project but would not commit to a schedule to undertake an independent review of the population and toll estimates the LB&A found “unreasonably optimistic.” As a multi-project agency that is currently the lead agency on the “bullet gas line” and public housing, AHFC interest in maintaining its A credit rating was clearly a key factor in the Committee’s willingness to transfer the Bridge from the one-project-KABATA agency to the multi-project AHFC. Click here for the Anchorage Daily News’ summary of the Rules Committees deliberations.

With leadership support and further clarifying Amendment 2 to Amendment 1 to CS HB 23 setting up a new Knik Arm Crossing Fund in AHFC, the legislation then easily passed the House 24-15. Presumably believing the bridge project should be killed now, almost all the Democrats and two Republicans Eric Feige (R-Chickaloon) and Transportation Chair Peggy Wilson (R-Wrangall) voted No. All other R’s plus D’s Kawasaki (Fairbanks), Foster (Nome) and Nageak (Barrow) approved the project’s transfer to AHFC. For media accounts of the House action:

Click here for the Mat-Su Frontiersman coverage.

Click here for the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner recap.

Click here to read the Alaska Budget Report’s account of the House actions. Copyright Alaska Budget Report. Reprinted by permission.

The Senate: Running Out the Clock

After revised CS HB 23 passed the House at 1 AM on Friday April 12, the Senate Finance Committee that afternoon began deliberations after several days of having the public hearing for SB13 being re-scheduled day after day. But Senate President Charlie Huggins slowed any momentum for the new CS HB 23 by supplying a pro-Bridge witness list to the Senate Finance Committee, and Finance Co-Chair Sen. Kevin Meyers (R-Anchorage), said that he wanted to give KABATA a chance to reply to the Audit findings. Click here to read the Daily News-Miner’s account of Senator Huggins’ reluctance to rush the bill.

Senate Transportation Chair Dennis Egan (D-Juneau) had earlier held a public hearing on the original HB 23/SB 13 but when the revised HB 23 got to Senate Finance Committee on April 12, Co-Chair Kevin Meyer (R-Anc) allowed only invited testimony from pro-Bridge advocates.

On April 2, 2013, the Senate Finance Committee had heard a long presentation by David Livingston of Citigroup on the virtues of public-private partnership structure (P3s ). Livingston cited five launched but not yet completed P3 projects, but only one used KABATA consultant CDM Smith for the traffic and toll forecast. Click here to download the presentation.

In reply, Government Hill Community Council President Bob French and financial analyst Jamie Kenworthy annotated the Citigroup presentation highlighting three CDM Smith toll projects that have gone bankrupt since completion. Click here to download the annotated document.

Click here for a full listing of documents available to the House for deliberations on HB 23.

Click here for the full listing of documents associated with the later Senate deliberations.

Despite calendaring public testimony on the revised HB 23, the Senate Finance Committee on April 12, took no public testimony, and ultimately took no action on either version of the bridge bill. The legislature session expired before midnight April 14.

Both houses did pass the capital budget SB 18 which contained the Governor’s requested $10 M for the project part of the 4 year $150 M “down payment” KABATA identified last year as necessary to fund the reserve fund for the project. However, section 54 of the capital bill had a contingency making that $10 million appropriation contingent on “enactment into law of a bill creating the Knik Arm Crossing Fund” which was contained in the never-passed CS HB 23.

Without the expanded state guarantee and the additional $100 million in private activity bonding authorized by HB 23, and without the $10 M from the capital budget, it is considered extremely unlikely that the project will win the $300-500 million in federal loans necessary to launch the project.

Further late session media comment on KABATA’s declining credibility see: This Alaska Dispatch report and this Frontiersman editorial, and this copyrighted Alaska Budget Report story listing high KABATA salaries, reprinted by permission.

4 Untold Stories

The frenetic deliberations on the KABATA bills in the last few days of the session left the media with little time or perhaps less interest in covering four curious developments during that period.

1) Bridge Cost: $1.1 Billion, $1.6 Billion, $2.6 Billion or Unknown?

Media accounts seem understandably confused about the cost of the project. During the session which started in January, 2012 KABATA representatives described the total cost of the project at $1.1 Billion, a number based on KABATA’s August, 2012 financial plan.

However, the LB&A audit contained a new financial plan submitted by KABATA and dated December, 2012 showing a higher project cost of $1.6 Billion. The new plan included the cost of building 4 lanes on the Bridge in 2026 since apparently the auditor convinced KABATA that it was unreasonable to include the revenue from four full lanes of traffic from 2026-2051 without including the cost of expanding the bridge to four lanes. During all the committee deliberations the legislature did not refer to the $500 million higher cost number. The 4 lanes of revenue, 2 lanes of cost problem was first noted by Jamie Kenworthy in an August, 2011 presentation (see 11/13/11 post below) to the Technical Advisory Committee of the Anchorage Metropolitan Area Transportation Planning Committee (AMATS) but until the LB&A audit was released on 4/6/13 no public entity had acknowledged the extra costs associated with building the additional two lanes.

KABATA’s new $1.6 Billion estimate is still based on land use assumptions the auditor found are inconsistent with Mat-Su Borough adopted plans and “unreasonably optimistic” traffic and toll projections. Bridge critics maintain the project cost will be $2.6 Billion (click here to see “Real Cost” paper) but no media stories cited the higher possible number for the project.

The auditor deliberately made no project cost figure arguing no estimate was possible until an independent traffic and toll study was done.

This summer the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is scheduled to redo the now five year old cost estimate.

2) Department of Transportation: Now Watching From the Sidelines

One sign of possibly declining administration support for the bridge project is the changing position of the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF).

In past years DOTPF officials have described the bridge as a “high priority” and testified to the legislature in support of the project. Last year DOTPF authored an artfully written fiscal note that said the project would cost $0 contingent upon the KABATA traffic and toll estimates being accurate.

The Commissioner of DOTPF did testify before the Senate Finance Hearing on April 2, 2013, but his testimony essentially distanced DOTPF from the work that KABATA was doing.

This year’s $0 cost fiscal note was signed by Michael Rovito, KABATA’s new legislative liaison and Andrew Niemiec KABATA’s Executive Director.

It might be argued that the legislative record that showing the fiscal note as coming from DOT was technically correct because KABATA is administratively attached to DOTPF. However, the legislative information system listing from the zero cost estimate from DOTPF was misleading because it did not include the $150 million of State Funding for KABATA’s “Reserve Fund”, and did not include the additional $41 million of State Funding that KABATA predicts will be necessary to replenish the “Reserve Fund”, starting in 2031, well after FY2019 which is the last year noted in the “zero fiscal note”. The Department of Revenue also signed a $0 cost fiscal note.

It is not clear what has led to DOTPF’s change of heart on the project. Bridge critics had briefed DOTPF on the 4 lanes of revenue and 2 lanes cost problem after 2026 so it may be that they decided they could not sign the $0 cost note even with the broad caveat that it was contingent on the accuracy of KABATA toll projections. Since the draft audit was circulating internally for comment in February, 2013 and the fiscal note appeared a month later, DOTPF probably had advance warning of the audit’s findings and sensed an impending shifting mood in the legislature.

In any case, when the LB&A audit was released and DOTPF had to provide a written comment, DOTPF Commissioner Pat Kemp had a one sentence response that could be construed as another sign that his department was distancing itself from the project: “The Department has no comments as the only finding is specific to the Knik Arm Bridge and Toll Authority.”

3) Department of Revenue: The Conveniently Canceled Financial Review

The Alaska Department of Revenue (ADOR) is the state’s chief guardian of Alaska’s high AAA/AA+ credit rating from the nation’s three largest ratings firms.

On January 7, 2013, just before legislative session started, ADOR released a Request For Proposals (RFP) to select a firm to assess the financial feasibility of the Knik Arm bridge project and asked for proposals in only 11 days. Two firms responded: the New York office of First Southwest Company and the New Jersey-based firm Acacia Financial Group. Both firms had a presence in Alaska.

The RFP # 2013-0400-1683 listed a schedule for the expected $25,000-$225,000 contract assumed an award on 2/4/13 for a 1 year contract with two one year possible extensions. The contractor was to “review the reasonableness of the assumptions” of KABATA’s traffic and revenue consultant Wilbur Smith and the Citigroup Financial Plan and “review, verify, and confirm recommended financing structures for the State’s participation in the Knik Bridge Crossing.” Any firm that had done work for KABATA in the last five years was considered a conflict and not allowed to bid on the project.

Clearly ADOR was interested at that time in a non-KABATA source assessing the project’s financial feasibility and seeking to independently determine the state’s liability in KABATA preferred P3 structure with the contractor and not the state issuing bonds. The RFP described how the chosen firm would work with KABATA and Deputy Revenue Commissioner Rodell and other state officials in assessing the project and recommending financing options.

In February, 2013, Government Hill Community Council President Bob French made a public records act request of ADOR seeking to discover the status of the project. On February 22, 2013 department procurement officer Dorie Choquette informed French that ADOR had “received a protest regarding the Alaska Bidders preference which needs to be researched further by the Department of Law” and so the department had cancelled the solicitation.

The response to French’s information request showed that two of three bid reviewers had voted to award the bid to the Acacia firm but it was subsequently learned that the Alaskan bidders protest had been made by competitor First Southwest.

Deputy Revenue Commissioner Angela Rodell is Revenue Commissioner Butcher’s designee to sit on the KABATA Board. She was the former Senior VP at the NY office of First Southwest before becoming Deputy Commissioner in September, 2011. She is considered the department’s leading authority on public finance markets.

With the protest of the potential award and subsequent late start it was doubtful that significant work could have been performed on the financial feasibility of the project and made public in the last six weeks of session. However, since the contract was for a minimum of a year and presumably the information was still sought by some members within the administration, it is not clear why this delay and protest led to the wholesale cancellation of the solicitation.

Deputy Commissioner Rodell did testify in the legislature in support of the project on April 2, 2013 before the House Finance Committee. But, as a result of the canceled procurement, the legislature in its deliberations did not have the benefit of ADOR’s planned independent review of the project’s financial feasibility.

4) KABATA’S Choice: Keep Control or Receive $10 Million and a Possible $300 Million Federal Loan?

When the House Rules Committee was debating moving the bridge project to AHFC, KABATA Chair Michael Foster argued that the transfer would dangerously slow the procurement of a contractor to build the project. However, that procurement depended on a state guarantee to cover the toll shortfall and $10 -$150 million in further state funds, as KABATA CFO Kevin Hemenway told his Board in February, to show the necessary state commitment to win a $300-$500 million federal TIFIA loan.

Last year KABATA estimated it needed only a $150 million state loan for a reserve fund to launch the project. The Governor’s December, 2012 capital budget request included $10 million for FY 14 as a “down payment” and then projected $35 M/year for 4 years to total the $150 Million.

Starting April 9 when KABATA was testifying against the AHFC transfer, the capital budget had not yet passed either House but the draft budget had been released April 6 with a contingency that made the $10 million available only if legislators established a new “Knik Arm Crossing Fund” that session. The only bill that could establish the necessary contingency was CSHB 23 – the same bill that would have transferred KABATA to AHFC. CS HB 23 would preserve the KABATA Board only for a year as an advisory Board to the AHFC Board and presumably KABATA employees could be rehired by AHFC or dismissed as AHFC redid the population, traffic, and financial projections.

As a result, Chairman Foster faced a tough tactical choice. Either he could go along with the AHFC transfer in CSHB 23, meet conditions for the $10 million, and increase the chances for a $300-$500 million federal loan that could launch the project. Or he could preserve his own role in the project, at the cost of turning down the $10 million appropriation and essentially ruining KABATA’s chances to get a federal loan (the fate of which he warned the Rules Committee in his argument against the AHFC transfer).

Chairman Foster chose the latter course, keeping project control and staff continuity within KABATA at the expense of the project’s financing. Furthermore, the Senate’s ultimate non-action on all bridge bills preserved the agency for at least another year.

However, that choice leaves KABATA in a tough place when the legislature reconvenes in January, 2014. While KABATA will still be in control of the project, without any state guarantee or federal loan the project will remain stalled. And KABATA will again have to explain why it has failed for now the ninth time to win a federal TIFIA or TIGER loan.


The Audit

April 8th, 2013

Commissioned by the joint Senate-House Legislative, Budget and Audit Committee in January 2012, the audit on the Knik Arm Bridge project was released on Saturday evening April 6, click here for the full audit. The initial media coverage focused on the audit’s key conclusion that KABATA’s traffic and toll projections were “unreasonably optimistic.” For coverage by the Anchorage Daily News story, click here.

The Facts that Led to the “Unreasonably Optimistic” Conclusion of Bridge Tolls

Independent traffic consultant Timothy James and Associates of Phoenix, AZ made several documented findings that led to his conclusion that future Bridge revenue was projected to be too high:

  • The Mat-Su Borough had projected 4,515 jobs at Point MacKenzie opposite downtown Anchorage in 2035 compared to KABATA’s consultant CDM Smith’s projection of 14,337 jobs. While the Borough had adopted plans for the area to be industrial, KABATA’s consultant projected a large amount of retail space or the equivalent of 2.4 Dimond Centers. Retail spaces generate more traffic than the same amount of industrial space so this projected land use produced higher Bridge traffic than if the consultant used the Borough’s current land use plan. (This problem was documented in a February 19, 2012 post.)
  • “No evidence was found,” the consultant concluded, “to support the 50% market share” of Mat Su-Anchorage traffic to be taking the Bridge as opposed to the Glenn Highway which would still be closer for the vast majority of Borough residents living in the Palmer-Wasilla area.
  • KABATA projected that 12% of Bridge traffic would be commercial and paying higher commercial tolls. The consultant found that the commercial/non-commercial split to be “outdated and much higher than actual traffic count data supports.”
  • From 2001-2011, Glenn Highway traffic grew 2.5% a year. The consultant found that KABATA’s projected traffic growth of 5% a year to be excessive. (The consultant initially calculated that the Glenn had been growing 1.9% a year. This is the one number that consultant Timothy James revised for the final draft.)
  • The consultant noted that while data from the University of Alaska’s ISER projections of population and land use had been stated and documented, CDM Smith’s population and traffic projections were stated without showing backup data.  The LB&A consultant suggested that CDM Smith “could provide forecast land use patterns for the relevant TAZ’s (Traffic Analysis Zones) …[so] stakeholders could engage more fruitfully in discussions.”

    KABATA’s Missing New Financial Plan Surfaces: Project Now Costs $1.6 Billion

    During hearings before the House and Senate Transportation Committees, KABATA was asked the current cost of the project. The last public financial plan was from August 2012 which estimated a $1 billion cost with half the construction funds coming from a low cost federal loan that KABATA was turned down for a month later.

    The audit provides a new financial plan from KABATA dated December 2012 with a project cost now up to $1.6 Billion. Curiously, this higher number and revised financial plan did not surface during the March 2013 House and Senate Transportation Committee hearings when KABATA was asked for the project’s current cost.

    The new higher cost of the project was a result of KABATA having to fix the 4 lanes of revenue, 2 lanes of cost problem that was the basis for James Kenworthy’s complaint to the Inspector General of the US Department of Transportation (see November 7, 2012 post). By including the cost for expanding the Bridge to 4 lanes and connecting to Ingra-Gambell in 2026, KABATA’s new numbers show a cumulative project deficit out to 2046, or 30 years after the Bridge would be scheduled to open. The August 2012 Financial Plan showing 4 lanes of revenue after 2026 crossing a 2 lane Bridge produced a cumulative project deficit only for the first 9 years the Bridge would be open.

    The consultant did not project a current cost for the project in part because a number of construction risk costs have not yet been defined. Those risks include determining the depth of unstable Bootlegger clay in Knik Arm, estimating the cost of additional earth work necessary in rerouting the East approach to be consistent with the Muni agreement for the road behind the Port of Anchorage, and the cost of a 1,000’ longer bridge.

    Both the old and new KABATA financial plan still count on a $300-500 M federal TIFIA/TIGER low-cost loan as well as what the LB&A consultant characterized as the unreasonably optimistic toll revenue forecast. The consultant notes that KABATA has been turned down a cumulative 8 times from the federal TIFIA and TIGER programs.

    The new financial plan includes $97 million in contractor equity, up from $73 million in the old plan. The new, December 2013 plan is a 1 page spread sheet so it does not include the full cash flow analysis present in the old plan. What is clear from KABATA’s new plan is that the investors would be making a financing profit from the first year the Bridge opens.


    The one piece of good news for KABATA is that the audit found that KABATA had complied with state and federal requirements for public participation in the Environmental Impact Statement and pre-construction meetings.

    The bad news for KABATA is the consultant’s clear recommendation the traffic origin and destination study and traffic and toll forecast needs to be redone by an independent consulting firm. This would probably take 6-12 months but since the Corps of Engineers has not yet issued a permit for the project, it is not clear if following this recommendation would add additional time to the troubled project even if the state guarantee bill now in the legislature passes.